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MYTH AND MENTAL COMMITMENT*

by Thomas L. Shaffer**
My expectations in speaking to a group of healers
about the mentally ill
rather than as patients

as a person and citizen,

---

are that you will be re-

ceptive and reasonable, since the subject is of
special concern to you.

I have the impression that no

one in the world is happy about the state of treatment
for mental disorders -- least of all those who do the
treating.
Your expectations, in having a lawyer inflicted
upon you, may be that you will hear a harangue -- and
I think it best not to disappoint you.
We might reach both of these expectations by pretending that you are all federal judges and I, a noisy
civil-liberties lawyer -- one of those who argues that
welfare mothers are entitled to have as many children
as they want; and theatres are entitled to show dirty
movies; and Nazis, Kluxers, and Communists are
entitled to say what they think.
So, let us try that.
What I am going to ask you to do, as judges, is to
empty every mental institution, finally and completely,
*Delivered at a session sponsored by the Catholic
Hospital Association during the Americal Health Congress, Chicago, Illinois, August 10, 1972
**Dean, Notre Dame Law School.

of every patient who wants to leave.
judges, to open the doors.

I want you, as

If the people who will

leave should be locked up, it is surely not the business of healing to operate the jails that hold them.
I am going to ask you, judges, to put mental health on
the same basis as dental health.
If a dental patient would like to keep his rotten
tooth, the Constitution protects his right to do so.
If a kookie citizen wants to be kookie, judges, he has
a right to be kookie.
up.

He has a right not to be locked

He has a right not to be electrocuted, or mutila-

ted, or coerced, and badgered, and manipulated into
being like everybody else.

And no doctor or policeman,

spouse, parent, child, neighbor, or busybody has any
right to do him out of his kookiness.
I am asking you to open up mental treatment, put
it on a free-enterprise basis.

Take the bars off the

windows -- and I am asking this as a matter of fundamental constitutional right.

The coerced confinement

of bizarre people is a failure, and in its failure it
is a vast and unresponsive denier of the rights of men.
It is not and probably never has been a system of care
for the sick.

It is, and always has been, a system of

imprisonment.
Assumptions which are easily made in this prevailing system of imprisonment for bizarre and disturbed citizens are that:

(1) these citizens are ill,

in somewhat the same way a person with a broken arm is
ill;

(2) they are being treated for this illness, in a

necessary and temporary confinement;

and (3) they are,

in any event, dangerous people who have to be kept out
of circulation (and we know this to be true because
physicians, who understand these things, say it is
true).
Commitment to a mental institution, in reality, is
a life sentence to a place that is probably worse than
prison.

The sentence is passed with nothing even re-

motely resembling due process of law.

The fact is that

a person can be locked up because a physician says he
should be.

He can be kept locked up as long as a

physician says he should be.

And the only "treatment"

given may, at best, be a locked door; and, at worst,
a horrifying routine of humiliation, torture, and
curious surgery.
There are hundreds of thousands of people in this
state.

Every tenth one of the rest of us may

be in it some day.

There are more people confined be-

cause of supposed mental disability than there are in
hospitals for physical illness.

The ratio of physi-

cians to so-called mental patients is about one to a
thousand.

The American Psychiatric Association main-

tains that it should be one to 150.

Since society will

not hire the doctors, the solution is to release the
patients.

Mind you, I am only talking about patients who do
not want to be locked up.

Most of them were locked up

in the first place on a theory of untested witchcraft.
Standards of involuntary commitment have been under
attack for years by most of non-medical psychology,
and by many courageous and unheeded voices in the
psychiatric profession.
Patients are locked up because their behavior
annoys somebody who is able to get them locked up.
They are drugged or shocked into submission because
they refuse to act as a physician, or judge or bureaucrat, acting under medieval standards, thinks they
should act.

In Massachusetts the law says that I can

be confined against my will in a mental institution
if I am "likely to conduct" myself "in a manner which
clearly violates the established ... conventions ... of
the community."

In almost any state I can be locked

up in some frighteningly hideous place because a doctor
or judge, or even a relative who is weary of me, says
he thinks that commital to that place would be for my
own good.
Virtually, none of these so-called mental patients
is dangerous; the arrest rate among former mental patients is about one-half that of the general population.

Even if they were dangerous, one might wonder

why bizarre people should be locked up when the more
devious and more dangerous among us are not locked up.

"Mental illness,"

as Dr. Thomas Szasz says, is

"a metaphor which has been mistaken for a fact."

It

is a jail door for hundreds of thousands of citizens
and therefore a more ominous metaphor than the domestic
possession our Puritan forebearers believed in, or the
pacts with Satan which medieval man feared.
We do not really need a bill of rights for the
mentally ill.

All we really need is treatment of

mental patients as if they are people -- then apply to
them the same Bill of Rights we apply to everyone else.
If we do this, we shall say that mental illness is not
a justifiable reason for depriving a person of liberty
against his objection.

We shall say, if mental pa-

tients are really people, that they have a right to be
treated in accordance with the highest standards of
current medical practice.

If adequate resources do

not exist to provide that kind of care, the patient
should be free to leave the institution and find his
comfort elsewhere.

To put it another way, we shall say

that citizens have a right to medical facilities which
are at least as attractive, comfortable, and promising
as the average dentist's office.

Attractive, comforta-

ble, and promising enough, that is, that people do not
have to be forced into them.
We shall say that a person who is thought to be
mentally ill has a right to be protected from his
friends and relatives.

If they want to lock him up,

they will have to do so under the standards of the
criminal law -- and that will require the assistance
of a lawyer, trial by jury, protection against search
and seizure, and a sentence which is specific, terminable, and subject to review.

This would probably

signal the withering away from hospitals for the
mentally ill.

I suppose

(applying the apparent public

priorities we use in this country) the money saved as
a result can be used to start a war somewhere.
Your order, if you judges agree with me, would
probably put an end to such things as psycho-surgery
and electrical shock, since if patients can now choose
what happens to them, surely, none will choose electrical shocks or having their brains mutilated.

There is

evidence of a new enthusiasm for cutting on the brains
of kookie people.

An item in the Congressional Record

by a District of Columbia psychiatrist, charges that
the destruction of human brains in order to control
behavior is now being performed in this country on
hyperactive children -- some as young as five years
old -- on alcoholics, drug addicts, promiscuous housewives, and for the purpose of curing people who are
found to be excessively warm-hearted, delicate, conscientious, or enthusiastic.

This doctor wants

Congress to outlaw all psycho-surgery, whether the
patient consents or not.

Others in the healing pro-

fession -- most, perhaps -- would support the outlaw-

ing of electrical shock, which has always appeared to
me to be as scientifically defensible as letting blood
would be.
What will take the place of the abandoned mental
hospitals?

Here is a utopian prediction by Dr. Thomas

Szasz:
"The mental hospital should be a
new kind of institution, resembling
neither prison nor medical hospital.
Its purpose would be to provide the
kind of help rendered today by many
psychiatrists, psychologists, and
social workers. These services are
more comparable to those obtainable
in certain schools, hotels, vacation
resorts, and aboard ocean liners,
than to those furnished by ordinary
hospitals. Accordingly, in mental
institutions (the term "hospital"
would only be distracting) few
physicians would be needed, and they
would care only for bodily diseases.
Until new standards are developed,
personnel for this sort of organization should be recruited from
those who demonstrate interest and
skill in this type of work, not from
those who meet the existing, but
irrelevant, institutional qualifications."
I must say that sounds almost attractive.

I might be

willing to go there without being arrested first,
which is now true of many mental hospitals with which
I am familiar.
In such a place, the Bill of Rights is no particular problem.

A person in that sort of institution

could: communicate freely with others, inside and outside, as the First Amendment provides; own things and
acquire things and give them away or sell them; have
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access to the courts in case somebody wants to push
him around; choose what is to be done to him -- at
least as much as you and I choose what is done to us
in, for example, a dentist's chair; and he could keep
his mouth shut, or speak in tongues, or be irresponsible, or sing at inappropriate times, if that is what he
wished.
Well, there are many reasons why you, as judges,
may not give me what I, as a lawyer, say the Constitution requires.

One is that some mental patients cannot

choose or cannot care for themselves, and others really
are dangerous.

But we can provide an objective choice

for people who cannot choose.

And by objective choice

I mean a non-medical, outside judgment -- by a judge
if need be.
We neither need a coercive hospital system to take
care of physically disabled people; nor do we need it
to take care of people who really are dangerous.
Other institutions can do both of those things and do
not need the cloak of therapy to do it.

Other pro-

cedures will protect -- better than mental-health laws
have -- against the possibility that the patient's
welfare or the safety of other people are an excuse,
while the real reason for locking the patient up is
that he is a pain in the neck.
Reasons that most mental patients are where they
are have very little to do with mental health.

Senile

people are confined because local homes for old folks
will not admit them.

Sexual deviants are confined be-

cause it makes lawyers and judges, and most people it
seems, feel better to think that child molesters are
suffering from some sort of disease.

Somewhat similar

points could be made about people accused of crime,
drug addicts, alcoholics, and other kinds of dropouts
who end up in mental hospitals.

The mental-health

system has been made to bear the sins of our callous
treatment of old people, our guilt over our inhuman
prison system, our hypocritical attitudes on sex, and
heaven knows what else.
Much of this probably annoys you, but I assure
you that all of this, and more, is being brought before
real judges right now.

Our archaic official approach

to bizarre behavior may well go the way of segregated
schools, and mal-apportioned legislatures, and illegal
police practices.

The elected representatives of the

people, and the people themselves, have neglected this
injustice so long that not even a judge can hide from
it any longer.

A federal judge in Alabama has by court

order replaced the state supervisor of mental institutions and has ordered that state to employ the staff
necessary to provide individual, prompt, humane care.
The court-ordered ratio of staff to patients there is
nearly one-to-one.

He further ruled that no one can

be held in mental institutions there for more than six

10
months.

In that case, and in several others, federal

judges have held that lack of funds or facilities is
no defense.
That, of course, gets us back to what I would be
asking of you if I were a lawyer for your patients and
you were judges.

Since, according to the American

Psychiatric Association, no state provides enough money
for adequate staff, the best answer is for healers to
get out of the business of forcing people to become
normal.

Mental healers should be working on willing

patients -- with whom success is much more likely anyway -- and leave the unwilling to cruder forms of consolation.

This is more than an inflammatory argument.

We do well to stop and realize that our opinion -of professional judgment -- that someone is disabled
may tell more about us than it does about the person
who is supposed to be disabled.

"A handicapped person'

in the sociological definition, "is a person whom
others think is incompetent or unattractive; someone
whom others want to help or protect or avoid."
world tells a person like that he is sick.
"No, I'm not sick."
that's your problem.
sick.

So the

And he says

And the world says "Well, you see,
You just don't believe you're

That's why you're sick.

If you only could see

that you are sick, everything would be alright.
wouldn't be sick any more."

You

What we may really mean,

is that he does things we think he shouldn't -- like

the coronary patient in the limerick:
My doctor has made a prognosis
That intercourse fosters thrombosis
But I'd rather expire
Fulfilling desire
Than abstain and develop neurosis.
A society in which deviant people are identified
not only identifies the deviance, it creates it.

In

specific reference to mental patients, the sociologists have noticed that psychiatric diagnosis does not
correlate either to observable behavior or to treatment.

The word "schizophrenia" does not describe what

people do and it carries no clear indication of what
should be done to them.

It has no purpose, in other

words, except as a reason for confinement or for seeing
a psychiatrist.

It resembles the process in which

some public schools decide that children are retarded.
Retarded children, the schools maintain, do not do
very well in school.

What is a retarded child?

Some-

one who does not do very well in school!
Someone who gets a label tends to act as the label
says he should.

Then everyone else acts as they should

toward people who have that label.
oriented toward the label.

Soon, everything is

And that, the sociologists

say, is how an "oddball" becomes psychotic and hot.
somebody's troublesome relative becomes your mental
patient.

According to the sociologists, our most

common forms of segregation are: prisons for the
behaviorally different; mental institutions for the
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emotionally different;

rehabilitation centers and

special schools for the physically different; and
ghettoes for the racially different.
Judges may force mental hospitals to treat citizens humanely, but not even judges can fathom or
correct the complex biases by which we separate ourselves.

It is that thought which prevents me from

feeling self-righteous about your profession and the
mentally ill.

My profession has, I am sure, done more

to build walls around outcasts than yours has.

I am

hoping that we can cooperate, however, in pulling the
walls down.
I should summarize in more specific terms regarding the rights of mental patients in the coercive system we have.

Here are a few specifics:

(1) A person

who is committed for mental care on a court order
should have all of the procedural protections given a
criminal defendant -- including notice, counsel, jury
trial, and the privilege against self-incrimination;
(2) the grounds on which people are involuntarily
committed should be rigorously examined for empirical
validity -- not merely clinical validity -- and should
be subjected to rigorous constitutional evaluation.
It seems to me clearly unconstitutional to lock a man
up because he might harm himself, or because his conduct is unconventional.

It seems equally unconstitu-

tional to lock him up because he is dangerous, unless
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the person who asserts the danger can prove it to laymen beyond a reasonable doubt;

(3) every patient is

entitled to prompt, individual care, and should not be
held unless he gets it; his case should be reviewable
by a judge, at the patient's request, no less often
than every two months;

(4) unless the school of

psychotherapy, which is in control of the institution's
program, demonstrates that it is causing improvement
in the patient's condition, the patient has a right to
release.

Psychiatry does not have the right, and

should not have even the desire, to be a penal discipline.

If it cannot deliver cure -- and in many,

many cases, it demonstrably cannot do so -- it has no
right to detain free men;

(5) ordinary freedom to move,

own, communicate, and express oneself should be
guaranteed to a patient unless the medical team can
demonstrate to a judge that deprivation is medically
essential;

(6) unless the patient is continuously and

completely dissociated, he should retain the right to
refuse any medical or psychological procedure, including procedures of questionable integrity such as
electro-shock and psycho-surgery.

If the patient is

unable to act, these doubtful procedures should be
permitted only on court order, after a hearing in
which the patient is represented by counsel.
This is a fairly tough regimen, but it seems to
me that we have to do things that way in a free

society.

Everything I say really depends on a general

recognition of the rather obvious principle of human
liberty:

"My freedom is never in greater danger than

at the hands of someone who tells me that what he
wants to do to me is for my own good."
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